This paper formalizes the following intuition about open-market share repurchases. Firms do open-market share repurchases to return free cash, which would otherwise be wasted. However, when the firm goes to buy its own shares with this cash, it has inside information and hence the actual execution is characterized by adverse selection. The market knows that the firm has inside information, and consequently the ask price is high to compensate for this adverse selection problem. This implies that, all else equal, the greater the adverse selection problem compared to the cash waste problem, the higher the ask price, and, therefore, the wider the bid-ask spread and the lower the share repurchase completion rate. We test this implication on a sample of U.S. firms and report evidence consistent with the model. r
Introduction
Over the last two decades, announcements of open-market stock repurchase programs (henceforth, ''open-market programs'') have become common practice (see, for example, Grullon and Michaely, 2002 (2000) find average actual repurchase rates to be as low as 28% in Canada, and Rau and Vermaelen (2002) find average actual repurchase rates of only 37% in the United Kingdom. Empirical studies also disagree on the effect of open-market program announcements on liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread. In the U.S., Barclay and Smith (1988) find widening of the spread. Miller and McConnell (1995) Why is there variability in actual repurchase and in the bid-ask spread during the repurchase period across firms and across studies? What is the optimal way to execute an open-market repurchase program? The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework with which to answer these questions.
Unlike most earlier theoretical investigations of open-market programs, we build on the motivation to distribute free cash in order to avoid its waste. Growing empirical evidence suggests that the availability of free cash, and the need to avoid wasting it, play an important role in decisions to execute open-market programs. For example, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Oswald and Young (2004) find that actual repurchases depend on the availability of free cash. Nohel and Tarhan (1998) find that repurchasing helps firms that are likely to overinvest improve their performance. 2 We take the program announcement as given in order to focus on the execution.
3
Assuming uncertainty and asymmetric information about firm value, we show that the execution is the solution to an optimization problem over waste-prevention benefits from paying out free cash and gains (or losses) from the informed trade of the firm. Specifically, if the firm learns that it does not have free cash, it refrains from executing the program so as not to hurt investment. If, instead, the firm learns that it does have free cash, it will always execute the repurchase when the stock is undervalued, because in this case it benefits from preventing the waste of free cash, and it also accrues trading gains from the (informed) repurchase trade. When the stock is overvalued, however, the firm is less likely to execute the repurchase because in this case it faces a tradeoff between waste prevention gains and trading losses. The greater the overvaluation, the less likely the execution. Thus, open-market programs enhance value to shareholders by distributing free cash, but also result in wealth transfers among shareholders because of the informed/strategic trade of the firm.
